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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEDICAL AND LEGAL
INsANITY.-Starting on this subject, one is immediately warned of the
hazards in attempting to give a definition of these terms, in order that
we may have a rule by which we might determine responsibilities, under
both the legal and the medical sense. We find jurists, medical men and
psychologists differing with each other and within their profession, con-
cerning a standard definition of insanity, whether legal or medical.
Since the medical and legal authorities recognize different kinds and
degrees of insanity, it is best to give you a definition of each. Bouvier
says: "Insanity in medicine has to do with a prolonged departure of
the individual from his natural mental state arising from bodily dis-
ease." 1
"In law insanity is such a deprivation of reason that the subject
is no longer capable of understanding and acting with discretion in
the ordinary affairs of life." 2
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, 8 it must now
be regarded as well settled that mere mental depravity or medical insan-
ity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from
a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally
sane, does not 'exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed
under its influence.
In Andersen v. State, 4 where the petitioner was convicted of mur-
der in the first degree and *sentenced to be hanged, on petition for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the court said:
"The courts have been slow to recognize moral insanity as an excuse
for crime, but it exists, and a jury where satisfied of its existence in a
particular case ought to consider it in determining the degree of the
crime. Unsoundness of mind is a fact which is not susceptible of direct
proof and it is a consideration of importance in the present case, that
even if -the proof should not establish the total want of resp.nsibiity
by reason of insanity, yet it might show that the prisoner's mind was
so impaired that he was incapable of a deliberate, premeditated murder
and so should be convicted only of murder in the second degree."
1 Bouvr's LAw DicuioARY, p. 1052.
2 Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60 (1892).
3 Scott v. Commonwealth, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227 (1863).
4 43 Conn. 514 (1876).
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The prevailing American rule is set forth in the case of Sharp v.
State 5 where the defendant was indicted for the offense of sodomy and
the defense of insanity at time of offense is set up, and the court said:
"In criminal jurisprudence, persons who indulge in the excessive use
of intoxicants, and thereby become degraded and depraved in their
morals, are not necessarily, for that reason alone, to be considered
insane, so as to absolve them from responsibilities for a crime com-
mitted." 6
Although the evidence upon the issue of insanity of the defendant
in a criminal case may be weak and possess but little weight, still if it
is of such strength that the jury may reasonably infer that the defend-
ant was in contemplation of law, of sound mind at the time he com-
mitted -the offense, then the question of his insanity, upon the evidence,
under the circumstances, is not one open to review by the supreme
court on appeal. The court, in Lee v. State 7 (where insanity was a
defense) said: "Where the circumstances are of such a character
that the jury might have reasonably drawn an inference of' guilt of
the accused, the question of guilt becomes one of fact for the deter-
mination of the jury and trial court and is not open to review on
appeal." 8
In Swartz v. State 9 the defendant was found guilty of incest, and
he brought error. The court said: "Moral insanity as a criminal
defense is not recognized in this state. One who knows abstractedly,
what is right and what is wrong, must at his peril, choose the right
and shun the wrong. He cannot yield to a vicious impulse, and allege
mere weakness of will as an excuse."
5 161 Ind. 288 (1903).
6 Accord: Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193 (1887) (Holding,
when insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal case, it must be established
to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the testimony, and a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, raised by all the evidence, does
not justify an acquittal.); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186 (1915);
State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904); Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28,
13 Atl. 809 (1888); Bothwell v. State, 99 N. W. 669 (Neb. 1905); Mackin v.
State, 36 Atl. 1040 (N. J. 1897); Flanagan v. People, 11 Am. Dec. 731 (N. Y.
1873); State v. Potts, 6 S. E. 657 (N. C. 1888); Leach v. State, 3 S. W.'539
(Tex. 1886).
7 156 Ind. 54 (1901).
8 Accord: Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343 (1900); Rinkard v. State, 157
Ind. 534 (1901); Braxton v. State, 157 Ind. 213 (1901); People v. Kerrigan, 73
Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849 (1887) (Defendant set up defense of moral insanity to
charge of murder; the court said: "Moral insanity, as distinguished from mental
derangement, is no excuse for crime nor an exemption from punishment there-
for."); People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124, 106 N. E. 219 (1914) (The court said:
"Every man is presumed to be sane, and in the absence of evidence which may
raise a reasonable doubt as to his insanity, no evidence need be introduced.").
9 91 N. W. 190 (Neb. 1902).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Sanders v. State l0 the defendant was convicted of murder and
he appealed on the ground of insanity. The court said: "Ungovernable
passion is not insanity, and one whose power of will is not impaired by
disease, and who, yielding to passion, slays another is subject to the
punishment fixed by law."
In Dunn v. People 11 the appellant was adjudged guilty of murder
and set up the defense of insanity. The court stated: "Where a man
knows that it is wrong to do a certain act, and possesses the power of
mind to do or not to do the act, it would be a dangerous doctrine to
hold that such person should not be -held responsible because he might
not be regarded entirely and perfectly sane."
In Hopps v. People 12 Hopps was indicted for the murder of his
wife. The fact of the killing was clearly established, but it was insisted
that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged.
In substance, the court says that this unsoundness of mind or affec-
tion of insanity must be of such degree as to create an uncontrollable
impulse to do the act charged, by overriding the reason and the judg-
ment, and obliterating the sense of right and wrong and depriving the
accused of the power of choosing between right and wrong as to the
particular act done.
In many jurisdictions the courts, when insanity is relied on as a
defense, do not limit the test of responsibility to the mere capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong either generally or as to the par-
ticular act but go farther than this and recognize that a person may
know the nature and quality of an act whidh he does, and that it is
wrong or contrary to law, and yet do the act under the influence of an
insane irresistible impulse; and it is held that, although there may
have been a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the
particular act, still the party is not responsible if the jury finds that
by reason of duress of mental disease he had so far lost the power to
choose between right and wrong as not to be able to avoid doing the
act, so that his free agency at the time was destroyed.1
In most jurisdictions, however, the courts have repudiated this doc-
trine and have limited the test of irresponsibility on the ground of
insanity to the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. So
that an irresistible impulse, even though it is claimed to have been an
insane impulse, does not exempt one from responsibility for crime,
10 94 Ind. 147 (1883).
11 109 Ill. 635, 644 (1884).
-12 31 Il. 385 (1863).
18 Plake v. The State, 121 Ind. 433 (1889); Hall v. Commonwealth, 155
Ky. 541 (1913); People v. Durfee, 29 N. W. 109 (Mich. 1886).
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where his -mental capacity was such that he had a knowledge of right
or wrong as to the particular act.1 4
Side by side with this doctrine of the criminal law which makes
persons, who from a medical point of view are insane, responsible for
their criminal acts is another, equally well recognized, viz., that a kind
and degree of insanity which would not excuse a person for a criminal
act may render him legally incompetent for the management of him-
self or his affairs.15
Mere imbecility or weakness of mind, however great, is not insanity.
There must be a total want of understanding.16
To avoid a deed or other instrument on the ground of insanity it
is indispensable that such instrument be the product of the insanity.17
The general rule, universally laid down, that a deed or other con-
veyance of an insane person is void or voidable, does not refer to
insanity in its technical meaning. And a deed may be 'upheld in a
proper case without reference to the abstract question whether the
grantor was sane or insane. The mere fact that the mind of the grantor
was to some extent impaired is not sufficient to invalidate the deed. 18
In Somers v. Humphrey 19 the court said: "Imbecility of mind is
not sufficient to set aside a contract where there is not an essential
privation of the reasoning faculties, or an incapacity of understand-
ing and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life. The law
cannot undertake to measure the validity of contracts by the greater
or lessor strength of the understanding; and if the party be compos
mentis, the mere weakness of his mental powers does not incapacitate
him." 20
In conclusion, it may be said, with reasonable assurance, that the
legal profession considered as a whole consistently holds that it is
necessary for the defendant to prove his insanity in the particular
act accused, while the medical profession always holds the person
insane at the slightest provocation and that a person might have a
diseased mind and be insane as to all his acts and should be, in con-
templation of law, not responsible.
I George R. Landgrave,
14 Davis v. State, 32 So. 822 (Fla. 1902); State v. Lyons, 37 So. 890 (La.
1904).
15 Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485 (1869).
16 Samson v. Ladies of Maccabees, 131 N. W. 1022 (Neb. 1911); Johnson v.
Miller, 110 Neb. 830 (1923).
17 Schley v. Horan, 118 N. W. 659 (Neb. 1908); Blakely v. Blakely, 33
N. J. Eq. 508 (1881).
18 Lindsey v. Lindsey, 50 Ill. 79, 99 Am. Dec. 489 (1869); Guild v.
Warner, 149 Ill. 105 (1893); Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 305, 83 Am. Dec. 514 (1864).
19 24 Ind. 231 (1865).
20 Accord: Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310 (1876).
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.-THE INFANT'S INDORSEMENT.-DIS-
AFFIRMANCE OF INDORSEMENT AND RECOVERY OF THE INSTRUMENT.-
The infant plaintiff is payee of a note which he indorses. His in-
dorsee indorses to an innocent party defendant who can qualify as a
holder in due course. Either before or after attaining his majority,' the
infant indorser repudiates his indorsement. Queries: (1) Is the in-
fant entitled to disaffirm his contract of indorsement?; and (2) Is the
infant entitled to recover the instrument?
The first question engenders little contentious discussion because
in the majority of courts the common law favored an infant and
permitted him to disaffirm his contracts whether they were contracts
of sale, purchase or indorsement. The common law paternally adopted
as to infants' contracts the instinctive protection for infants which is
co-eval with mankind and permitted the infant to avoid his liability
on a bill or note whether it be secondary or primary liability. The
majority of jurisdictions under the common law merchant held that
an infant's liability is voidable and that the right to avoid is absolute
and superior to the rights of a bona fide holder or assignee.2 An early
Tennessee case held that an infant's liability on a bill or note was
void and not voidable.3
Since the primary and secondary liability of an infant was voidable
we have these results from the decisions: (1) The indorsement of a
negotiable instrument by an infant passed the property in the instru-
ment and the holder could recover payment from the maker in the
absence of the infant indorser's disaffirmance; and (2) The act of
disaffirmance was a defense available to the infant only or his per-
sonal representatives and the maker or drawer was precluded from
setting up the infancy of the payee-indorser as a defense in a suit
by the infant's indorsee.
As to the second question, whether the infant is entitled to recover
possession of the instrument after he indorses and sells and the in-
I A deed of land cannot be finally avoided before the infant attains his
majority. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300 (1880); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb,
81 Mo. 221 (1883).
Other contracts may be avoided during infancy or after attaining majority.
Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 280, 59 Am. Dec. 345 (1853); Shipman v. Horton, 17
Conn. 481 (1846); Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80 (1852); Patterson v. Kasper,
182 Mich. 281, 148 N. W. 690 (1914).
2 OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTaumENTs, 3 ed., p. 39; PARSONS, Bu.s AND Norm,
p. 276; Briggs v. McCabe, 27 Ind. 327 (1866) ; Craig et al. v. Van Bebber et al.,
100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906 (1890); Roach v. Woodall et al., 91 Tenn. 206, 18
S. W. 407 (1892); Sewell v. Sewell et al., 92 Ky. 500, 18 S. W. 162 (1892);
Searcy et al. v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372 (1891); Hasler v. Beard, 54
Ohio St. 398, 43 N. E. 1040 (1896); Frazier v. Massey, 14 Ind. 315 (1860);
Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272 (1818); Guy v. Cooper, 3 Doug. 65,
99 Eng. Rep. 541 (1782) ; Jones v. Darch, 4 Price 300, 146 Eng. Rep. 471 (1817);
Willis v. Twambly, 13 Mass. 204 (1818).
a McMinn v. Richards, 14 Tenn. 9 (1834).
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strument is held by a bona fide purchaser, there are no cases in the
American reports that directly decide this prior to the Negotiable In-
struments Law. There are at least two American cases which hold
that an infant is entitled to recover a non-negotiable instrument from
an innocent purchaser.4
England has an interesting case which does not directly decide the
latter question. In the case of Taylor v. Croker5 two infants drew
a bill of exchange payable to themselves which was accepted by the
defendant. The infant drawers indorsed to one Sizeland who in-
dorsed to the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser. Sizeland misappro-
priated the funds. As a defense the defendant proved that the in-
fants demanded the bill from the plaintiff disclosing the fraud of
Sizeland and claiming the bill to be theirs, the infants. Lord Ellen-
borough said: "In an action against the acceptor by an indorsee, it
is no defense that the drawers who had drawn the bill payable to
themselves and indorsed it, were infants when the bill was drawn."
Lord Ellenborough's decision permits of several interpretations: (1)
The mere demand by the infants for their bill was not a sufficient
disaffirmance to revest them with title to and property in the bill;
or (2) An infant cannot disaffirm a contract of indorsement so as
to revest himself with title to and property in a negotiable instrument
when it is owned by an innocent purchaser-indorsee.
Having no English case which decided an infant's right to a re-
turn of a chattel, negotiable instrument or piece of land when it had
come into possession of a bona fide purchaser-indorsee, or vendee,
it is not certain just what Lord Ellenborough indirectly decided. If
the common law of England on revestment of title after disaffirmance
was the same as the American common law, Lord Ellenborough erred
in his decision because in America when an infant demanded a return
of his property it was as though there had been no sale and title
reverted to the infant. Since there can be only one legal title to
property the plaintiff, could not have recovered under American com-
mon law. If the common law of England did not permit an infant
to recover his property from a bona fide purchaser or indorsee, Lord
Ellenborough's decision was correct. Brannan accepts the interpreta-
tion that an infant could not recover the instrument.6
Until the drafting of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896,
such was the legal status of an infant's rights and liabilities on a nego-
tiable instrument in the United States.7 That Act provided by Sec-
4 Willis v. Twambly, op. cit. supra, note 2; Briggs v. McCabe, op. cit. supra,
note 2.
5 4 Esp. 187 (1802).
6 BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 4th ed. by Zechariah Chaffee,
Jr., p. 180.
7 The Act has been adopted in all the States, the District of Columbia and
all Territories except. Porto Rico. It has not been enacted in the Canal Zone.
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tion 22: "TJie indorsement or assignment of the instrument ...by an
infant passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of
capacity ... the infant may incur no liability thereon." Section 22 has
been interpreted to be nothing more than a codification of the law
merchant or case law on the subject of disaffirmance. It miight be
well to consider a few common well known rules regarding the appli-
cation of statutes before discussing the cases that have been decided
under Section 22. A statute is not construed as changing the common
law beyond what is expressly stated or necessarily implied, and when
a case is doubtful there is a presumption that the drafters of the stat-
ute intended no change. The drafters of the Negotiable Instruments Law
probably did not intend to abrogate and supersede the common law
rule that an infant might affirm or disaffirm his contract of indorse-
ment and in the event that the minor did not disaffirm his indorse-
ment passed title to the instrument. The purpose of the Negotiable
Instruments Law was to codify the law merchant and adopt the rules
which were concordant with better reasoning and wiser doctrine.
Such rules as were uniformly accepted were not changed and an at-
tempt was made to make the law certain and uniform by adopting
one or two or more conflicting rules, arising from disconcordant decisions
in the different jurisdictions, which one was thought best to eventuate
justice and pronounce the common law. Section 22 is ambiguous and
does not clearly state whether an infant might recover his negotiable
instrument when it is held by a holder in due course. Section 196 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law further provides: "In any case not
provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
Since there was no common law case that directly decided an infant's
right to recover a negotiable instrument when it was owned by a bona
fide indorsee, post-Negotiable Instruments Law cases apparently base
their decisions on the common law rules permitting an infant to re-
cover a personal chattel, piece of land, and a non-negotiable instru-
ment, and find negotiability and non-negotiability to have no weight.
The corresponding section of the English Bills of Exchange Act
is more perspicuous and certain in its language.8 Section 22 of that
Act provides: "Where a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant .. .
having no capacity or power to incur liability on a bill, the drawing
or indorsement entitles the holder to receive payment of the bill and
to enforce it against any other party thereto." By unequivocal words
it denies the infant's rights to recover his instrument. This section
may be a statutory expression of the English common law if- Lord
Ellenborough decided that an infant could not recover in Taylor v.
Croker, supra.
Murray v. Thompson et al.9 was the first American case to decide
the question of an infant's right to recover his negotiable instrument
8 judge Chalmers drafted the English Act and Parliament enacted it in 1882.
9 136 Tenn. 118, 188 S. W. 578 (1916).
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from an innocent indorsee after disaffirming his contract of indorse-
ment. This case was decided after Tennessee had adopted the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.' 0 The complainant, an infant, was the payee
of a note for $1,750. The note was made payable June 1, 1915, on
which day the complainant would become of age. On October 16,
1914, the father of the complainant, with authority of latter, sold the
note to Thompson, indorsing the name of his son without apprising
Thompson of the payee's infancy and without apprising Thompson that
he himself was not the payee. The proceeds were deposited to the
complainant's account and later lost in a saloon business enterprise.
There was no actual fraud in the transfer to Thompson. The chan-
cellor decreed that the complainant might disaffirm and recover the note,
but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the ruling on the grounds that
Section 22 changed the common law so as to deny an infant indorser
the right to disaffirm and recover the note. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee reversed the decision of the lower court, reasoning thus:
"It was to make certain and uniform the law on this point that Section
22 was embodied in the Negotiable Instruments Act. In stipulating
that the indorsement of the instrument by an infant 'passes property
therein,' it was meant to provide that the contract of indorsement is
not void, and that his indorsee has the right to enforce payment from
all parties prior to the infant indorser. The incapacity of the minor
cannot be availed of by prior parties. It was not intended to provide
that the indorsee should become the owner of the instrument by title
indefeasible as against the infant, or to make the act of indorsement
an irrevocable one."
The next case which directly decided the right to recover was the
case of Strother v. Lynchburg Trust and Savings Bank et al." Paul M.
Strother, infant payee of a negotiable note, indorsed the note to his
guardian who negotiated said note to the defendant bank. The
guardian then defalcated. Before attaining his majority the infant
learned of the defalcation and notified the defendant bank that he dis-
affirmed his contract of indorsement. This notice was not heeded by
the bank and the plaintiff repeated the disaffirmance and repudiation
after attaining his majority. The bank refused to make restitution
and the plaintiff began suit to recover his note. Judgment for the
defendant was reversed on appeal. The Virginia court followed the
interpretation of Section 22, established by the case of Murray v.
Thompson, supra, and reiterated the rule that the indorsement of an
infant passes the property in the instrument but the remote pur-
chaser acquires a voidable title.12  The courts which interpreted Sec-
tion 22 were hesitant to deny the infant his common law right to dis-
10 Tennessee adopted the Act in 1899.
11 156 S. E. 426 (Va. 1931).
12 Virginia adopted the Act in 1898.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
affirm his indorsement or sale and recover his chattel or piece of land
when the Negotiable Instruments Act neither expressly nor impliedly
denied this right.
The situation at cdmmon law in reference to an infant's right to
disaffirm a sale of a chattel or piece of land was analogous to the
present situation of an infant with respect to negotiable paper. A
contract of a sale of goods by an infant is voidable and if he elects to
rescind the sale and tenders to the purchaser the price received he may
recover his chattel or its value from a third person to whom it has
been sold without tendering the price received to such person even
if the latter qualifies as a bona fide purchaser. 13 Professor Williston
writes: "Though a transaction with an infant is merely voidable, it is
unlike contracts voidable for fraud or other equitable ground in this
respect; even a bona fide purchaser for value of property formerly
belonging to an infant, without notice that the seller acquired title
directly or indirectly from an infant, cannot retain the property if the
infant elects to rescind his transfer of title .... This rule has, how-
ever, been changed in the Uniform Sales Act, which makes no ex-
ception in favor of infants to the rule that a bona fide purchaser for
value from one who has a voidable title acquires a good title." 14
The Uniform Sales Act (§ 24) provides: "Where the seller of goods
has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the
time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of seller's
defect of title." Thiis Act has changed the common law rule as to
infant's right to recover his chattel from a bona fide purchaser in a
replevin action. It has derogated from the common law's infant pro-
tection policy and innovated a policy of once sold to an innocent pur-
chaser no recovery. New York decided the case of Casey v. Kastet 15
under the Sales Act. In this case the infant plaintiff made an assign-
ment in blank of a stock certificate to its agent, who sold to a bona
fide purchaser without authority. The plaintiff joined the United
States Steel Corporation, which corporation transferred the stock cer-
tificate on its stock book, with the agent defendant. This case de-
cided that an infant's appointment of an agent is a voidable act and does
not void bringing the sale within Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act,
and that the rescission of a transfer of a certificate of stock by an
infant does not invalidate even a subsequent transfer by the transferee
in possession to a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice,
13 Downing v. Stone, 47 Mo. App. 144 (1891).
14 WILLISTON o-, SALES, 2nd ed., § 14.
15 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924).
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under the New York Personal Property Law, Section 169, the transfer
of the certificate by an infant being made valid when made under
Section 162.16
In similar cases of transfers of land .by infants, the courts were
consistent in applying their chattel recovery policy. When an infant
had title to land which he conveyed, the conveyance was not considered
as being void but voidable and his right to disaffirm such conveyance
was absolute and superior to equities of other persons and this right
could be exercised by the infant against a bona fide purchaser from
his grantee. It was not necessary for the infant to turn to a court
of equity but he could bring ejectment on the theory that he never
made a legal conveyance. If the infant was able to return the con-
sideration or its equivalent he was required to do so but such return
was not a consideration precedent to his ejectment action.17 From
these land cases the following deductions can be made: Since the ac-
tioi of ejectment must be brought by one who has the legal title, a
statement of disaffirmance is sufficient to avoid the conveyance and
revest the infant with legal title, and the parties are reverted to their
positions with respect to the title that existed before the conveyance,
except that ordinarily the infant is out of possession of his land until
the termination of his ejectment action.
From a review of the two principal cases it appears that the
drafters of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended no change and
improvement in the law as to an infant's contract of indorsement.
From a study of the post-Negotiable Instruments Act cases we can
conclude that Section 22 provided expressly and impliedly: (1) An
infant's incapacity is not a defense available to prior parties; (2) An
infant's indorsement is not void but voidable and will pass the prop-
erty in the instrument; and (3) The common law right to disaffirm
and revest himself with title has not been superseded. The Negotiable
Instrume nts Act has added nothing to the negotiability of an infant's
indorsement contract other than to make it voidable in a state which
held such contract to be void at common law. From a comparison
with the Uniform Sales Act it is apparent that a bona fide purchaser
of a chattel once owned by an infant is in a position far superior to
that of a holder in due course of a note or bill once owned by an
infant. The drafters of the Negotiable Instruments Act permitted an
excellent opportunity to escape them to change the common law by
extirpating this legal anachronism which restricts and hinders the
transferability of notes on which an infant is a party. It might be
16 New York enacted the Uniform Sales Act into its Personal Property Laws,
Sept. 1,. 1911.
17 Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105 (1912); Mustard v. Wohl-
ford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. 329 (1859); Seed v. Jennings, 47 Or. 464, 83 Pac. 872
(1905); Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385 (1865).
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asked: Of what value is negotiability if transferability does not ac-
company? Such welfare as infants received under the judge-made
commoAi law is excessive and unreasonable and has resulted in what
has been termed "infantile paralysis." The free circulation and
transferability of negotiable instruments have not been improved by
Section 22 and in our day of complicated exchange, when investiga-
tion is difficult and frequently so impractical that it is prohibited,
holders in due course should have such protection as the drafters of the
Uniform Sales Act saw fit to extend to innocent purchasers of chattels.
The Uniform Sales Act drafters divorced infant protection from judge-
made rules and placed it under a wise legislative policy which was
expressed in a succinct, unequivocal and well reasoned statute in ac-
cordance with present day needs and conditions. Why should holders
in due course purchase a voidable title when an innocent purchaser
of a chattel purchases a good title?
John Fetzer.
PICKETING-INJUNCTION-How FAR PICKETING Is LAWFUL IN
STRIKEs.-Picketing has been defined as the act of "a body of men
belonging to a trade union set to watch and annoy men working in
a shop not belonging to the union or against which a strike is in
progress." 1
A strike is a combined effort by workmen to obtain higher wages
or other concessions from their employer, by stopping work at a pre-
concerted time. A strike is not of itself illegal.2
An injunction is "A prohibitory writ issued by the authority and
generally under the seal of a court of equity, to restrain one or more
of the defendants or parties, or quasi parties, to a suit or proceeding
in equity, from doing, or from permitting his servants or others who
are under his control to do an act which is deemed to be. inequitable
so far as regards the right of some other party or parties to such
suit or proceeding in equity." 3
With these definitions providing a basis for our discussion, we will
now consider a concrete case, in order to see how far these acts are
permissible. Workmen leave their employer, A. In endeavoring to
receive their terms of employment they picket A's premises. A wishes
to enjoin the pickets in order to enjoy a free labor market, and that
his employees and those wishing to work for him will not be turned
1 Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 77 N. W. 13 (Mich. 1898);
Goldfield Consol. Mines v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500 (1908).
2 Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, 126 N. Y. S. 949 (1911).
8 Bov=R's LAW DI TIONARY, Vol. 1, p. 1038.
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away. It is an open question in our law as to what rights the parties
have and how far they may go to advance these rights.
First, it will be necessary to consider the complainant's rights and
then how far labor is to be protected. The right of the complainant
may be placed under two headings: (1) A right based on an existing
contract, and (2) The right of "probable expectancy." 4 Some courts
rule that mere persuasion will suffice to violate the right; 5 others re-
quire some element of fraud or coercion in the defendant's conduct
to cause such a breach.6 That a contract relation should be free
from influences of third parties because it is a property right entitled
to the protection of the courts of equity is the opinion of Jersey City
Printing Co. v, Cassidy,1 where the court said: "The interest of an
employer or employee in a contract for services is conceded," and
adds, "where defendants in a combination or individually undertake
to interfere with and disrupt existing contract relations between the
employer and employee it is plain that a property right is directly
invaded."
Both law and equity recognize the right of the employer to have a
free labor market, and the laborer a free employment market. But
this right is not an absolute right. A chancellor must consider whether
he would do a greater injury by enjoining the pickets than would
result from refusing an injunction and leaving. the party to his
redress at law. Pickets may have rights equal to those of the com-
plainant. While society has a right to seek services for the lowest
possible price, every man has a right to get the most he can in return
for his services.8  This situation is the cause of competition. While
competition may be a warfare, the courts act as a referee to the con-
test, and they must judge what weapons, shields, and methods may be
used in the combat.
Coercion has always been condemned. Yet the courts have had
quite a bit of difficulty in determining what constitutes coercion. In
the case of Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy 9 it was held that the
test of coercive conduct is the effect of conduct on "the reasonably
4 Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 59 N. J. Eq.
49, 46 AtI. 202 (1899).
5 Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy- 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Ati. 230 (1902);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 69 AtI. 405 (Md. 1908).
6 Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93 (1909); Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430,
8 Am. Rep. 559 (1872); Beattie v. Callanan, 81 N. Y. S. 413 (1903).
7 Op. cit. supra note 5.
8 Wilbert, etc., v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110 (1908), Held the employer's right
to prevent intimidation of his employees by pickets is neither contractural nor
statutory, being the common law rule to a reasonably free labor market, but
that such right is not absolute, and is subject to conflicting rights.
9 Op. cit. supra note 5.
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prudent, reasonably courageous, and not unreasonably sensitive man."
We are here faced with the problem that what may be violence in one
case is not in another, and the facts of each case must be considered.
Legitimate competition approves of persuasion as a means to better
one's economic interest. Who can complain that another has taken
away his customers by offering them better wares at lower prices?
On the same grounds what employer can complain that strikers or
union men have convinced others not to be employed by him because
labor will greatly benefit by not working for him under certain condi-
tions? These means are justifiable provided the motive is for eco-
nomic advancement and not for personal spite. In Gueti er v. Alt-
man '0 the court said: "We know of no authority holding that an
action will lie for persuading a party not to enter into a contract."
Picketing is a broad term; it cannot be unlawful per se if it means
an act without physical annoyance, or hindrance of anyone, and
without molestation. However, it may mean a stationing of pickets
to coerce persons willing to work in the place patrolled and it then
becomes unlawful and an injunction may be granted."
Courts will grant injunctions even though the parties are liable to
a criminal prosecution, 12 or even though the workmen against whom
acts are directed are not under a contract to enter into or continue
the employment of the person whose premises are picketed. 13
Generally speaking, when picketing is connected with a purpose
antagonistic to the health and welfare of a community it is unlaw-
ful and will be restrained regardless of what .may be the right or
wrong of the wage controversy in furtherance of which the picketing
is carried on.14
Picketing has been forbidden by statute.' 5 A number of courts,
although this is a minority rule, condemn all picketing on the grounds
10 26 Ind. App. 587 (1901). Accord: Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
Woodworkers' Local Union, 165 Ind. 421 (1905) (Here the strikers were justified
in seeking higher wages).
11 Mills v. United States Printing Co., 91 N. Y. S. 185, 92 N. E. 214 (1910).
12 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896); Heitkamper v. Hoffman, 169
N. Y. S. 533 (1917).
13 Vegelahn v. Guntner, op. cit. sufra note 12.
14 Gottlieb v. Matckin, 117 Misc. 128, 191 N. Y. S. 777 (1921) (Interference
with milk supply).
15 See Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914)
(Here picketing is made a misdemeanor by statute).
See, also, Colter v. Osborne, 18 Manitoba L. Rep. 471. Canadian Statutes
and decisions hold picketing to be unlawful even for the purpose of peaceful
persuasion.
English statutes make an exception in favor of attending for the purpose of
obtaining or communicating information. See Note in 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 308.
NOTES
that picketing in its very nature, though intended for persuasion, is
a pretense for intimidation, and peaceful picketing is a mere color
or words existing only in name.16 These courts enjoin picketing
whether the persuasion was addressed to present or prospective em-
ployees of the complaint. 17 The view taken is that picketing is an un-
warranted disruption with free trade 18 and it is immaterial whether
the pickets are placed a few feet or a thousand feet from the premises
picketed.29
In Connett v. United Hatters 20 the court held when the employees
(unless under contract) leave their employment "they have no right
to interfere in the slightest degree with the efforts of the employer to
fill their places."
According to the majority rule, peaceful picketing is lawful. In
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union 21 the
court said: "Peaceful picketing in theory is not only possible but per-
missible and as long as it is confined strictly and in good faith to
gaining information, and to peaceful persuasion and argument it is
not forbidden by law." Decisions have gone so far as to hold that
picketing, the climbing of adjacent telephone poles, the watching of
shops, the massing of pickets in the streets and at entrances of picketed
Dremises, and constant surveillance, if confined to obtaining informa-
tion and lawful persuasion could not be enjoined.22
16 Vegeiahn v. Guntner, op. cit. supra note 12 (Holmes, J., dissented,. saying
that the assumption that the patrol necessarily carries with it a threat of bodily
harm is unwarranted).
Atchinson T. & S. R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (1905), held "there is and
can be no such thing as peaceful picketing any more than there can be chaste
vulgarity or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching."
17 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909) (The court
said: "The public rights are invaded the moment the means employed are such
as are calculated to and naturally do incite to crowds, riots, and disturbances of
the peace-a picket, in its very nature, tends to accomplish these very things").
's Rosenburg v. Retail Clerk's Assoc. Local No. 428, 39 Cal. App. 67, 177
Pac. 864 (1918).
10 Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Prot. Union, op. cit. supra note 1.
Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 I11. 424, Held, "The very fact
of establishing a picket is evidence of an intention to annoy, embarrass, and
intimidate whether physical violence is resorted to or not."
20 76 N. J. Eq. 202, 74 Atl. 188 (1909).
Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (1903), Held, if employees leave their em-
ployer it is of no concern to them as to whom is next employed and they are
not acting lawfully when inducing others, and their acts are injurious to their
former employer.
21 159 Fed. 500 (1908).
22 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated, etc., op. cit. supra, note 10; Keuffel
v. International Assoc. of Mach., 116 Atl. 9; 93 N. 3. Eq. 429 (1922); Cumber-
land Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., op. cit. supra note 4.
Contra: George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 72 N. J.
Eq. 653 (1911); Thomas Machine Co. v. Brown, 108 Atl. 116 (N. J. 1918);
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Segenjield v. Friedman23 held that the right to picket is founded
on constitutional principles and that no sound principle of law pro-
hibits orderly picketing. Peaceful picketing for information and per-
suasion has been declared lawful by statute.2 4
While pickets are permitted to use peaceful persuasion, yet we
cannot draw a line between peaceful and unlawful persuasion so they
can be easily defined. Where the line is to be drawn can best be
seen by the decisions and the circumstances of each case. It will
readily be seen that although pickets are allowed to use lawful means
to induce others to assist the striking employees, they must not carry
the attempt too far and annoy customers and employees who are un-
willing to listen to argument. 25 In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union C0.26
the court said: "Persuasion too emphatic or too long and persistently
continued may itself become a nuisance and its use a form of coercion.'
The right of persuasion is limited to dissuade but not to restrain men
from working.27
The question which comes up now is whether the motive of doing
damage to another although confined to peaceful persuasion is to be
treated a prima facie liability in tort. If the motive is not to be
treated as a prima facie tortious harm then equity will not enjoin such
Segenfield v. Friedman, 193 N. Y. S. 128 (1922) ("The right to picket is founded
on constitutional privileges."); Walter A. Wood Mowing, etc., v. Toohey, 114
Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. S. 95 (1921) (Striking workmen have as much right to picket
as to strike.); Southern R. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union No. 14, 111 Fed.
54 (1901); Christenson v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 110 Ill. App. 66
(1903) (Held, that where picketing and patrolling are used to mean mere watch-
ing, or being in the street should not be enjoined.) ; Peckins v. Rogg, 11 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 585 (Held, if picketing is conducted for the purpose of reporting to labor
unions the number of men employed by the former employer and to obtain in-
formation as to the success of the strike it is lawful if not accompanied by
intimidations.); Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (1908)
(Picketing of small number should not be enjoined.); Tri-City Central Trades
Council v. Amer. Steel Founderies, 238 Fed. 728 (1916); Beaton v. Tarrant, 102
Ill. App. 124 (1902) ; Foster v. Retail Clerk's Inter. Prot. Ass'n, 78 N. Y. S. 860
(1903); Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. S. 101 (1900); Standard Tube & Fork-
side Co. v. International Union, 7 Ohio N. P. 87 (1899) (Pickets were permitted
to speak in a proper way to men seeking employment from the owner of the
picketed premises, and to explain the matter and make such appeals as were
reasonable and proper).
23 193 N. Y. S. 128 (1922).
24 Truax v. Corrigan, 20 Ariz. 7 (1918).
25 Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. S. 264 (1891); Piano & Organ Workers', etc., v.
Piano & Organ Supply Co., 124 Ill. App. 353 (1906) ; Jersey City Printing Co. v.
Cassidy, op. cit. supra note 5; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 103
(1902) ; Niles-Bement Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Local, etc., 246 Fed. 851 (1917)
(A picket cannot compel another to listen against his will).
26 110 Fed. 698 (1001).
27 Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., op. cit. supra note 22; Jones
v. E. Van Winkle Gin and Mach. Works, 181 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236 (1908).
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activities, otherwise equity will or will not grant an injunction depend-
ing upon the adequacy of the legal remedy, or whether the interfer-
ence with the rights of the plaintiff can be justified upon the motive
of the actor. Some decisions will not restrain peaceful picketing re-
gardless of whether or not irreparable damages are being caused. 2"
The contrary view is found in Tuttle v. Buck 29 where the court said:
"When a man starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake
of profit to himself, but regardless of loss to himself and for the sole
purpose of driving his competitor out of business, and with the in-
tention of himself retiring upon the accomplishment of his malevolent
purpose, he is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort. In
such a case -he would not be exercising a legal right or doing an act
which can be judged separately from the motive which actuated him.
To call such conduct competition is a perversion of terms."
From the majority opinion it is obvious picketing is unlawful
when accompanied by antimidation,3 0 violence, coercion and threats,31
physical assault,3 2 and abusive language3 s designed to prevent work-
28 Waiter A. Mowing Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 186 N. Y. S. 95 (1921) (Peace-
ful persusion allowed even though damages are irreparable.); Foster v. Retail
Clerks' Inter. Prot. Ass'n, 78 N. Y. S. 360 (1902) (The motive of the pickets
cannot be enjoined if only persuasion is used); Atkins v. W. A. Fletcher Co.,
65 N. 3. Eq. 658, 55 AtI. 1074 (1903) (The employer must show his remedy
at law is inadequate before equity will interfere).
29 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909).
30 American Steele v. Wire Drawers' & Die Union No. 130, 90 Fed. 608
(1898); Cumberland Glass, etc. v. Glass Bottle, etc., op. cit. supra note 4;
Keuffel v. International Assoc. of Mach., op. cit. supra note 22 (Workmen wiling
to be employed but interfered with by intimidation are entitled to relief by in-junction); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (1906); Karges Furni-
ture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union, op. cit. supra note 22;
Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, op. cit. supra note 5; Standard Tube
& Forkside Co. v. International Union, 7 Ohio N. P. 87 (1899); Goldberg, etc.,
v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806 (1906).
31 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, op. cit. supra note 25 ("Picketing in and of
itself is not unlawful, but when accompanied by violence or any manner of
coercion or intimidation to prevent persons from engaging in service of em-
ployer, it is unlawful."); Herzog v. Fitzgerald, 77 N. Y. S. 366 (1902) (An in-junction was granted to restrain the acts of violence and threats but not. specifi-
cally to restrain picketing.); Connett v. United Hatters, 74 Atl. 188, 76 N. '.
Eq. 202 (1909) (Here turbulent affrays in the street, attacks on 'employees, as-
sembling of mobs resulting in riots, and annoying of employees were all con-
sidered unlawful means of picketing).
82 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, op. cit. supra note 25 (Held, that assaults
committed and threats of violence made though subject to criminal law does not
deprive equity from interfering).
8 Abusive language is as bad as physical violence, moreover every one has
the right to travel without having the disagreeable done to them. Beck v.
Railway Teamsters' Prot. Union, op. cit. supra note 1 (An injunction was
granted to restrain abusive language nitended to drive away employees.) ; Beaton
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men from continuing in or accepting employment with the person
against whom the acts are directed and injunctions will be granted. 84
The case of Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef 35 is interesting as the
court said intimidation cannot be defined but everyone knows whether
acts are intimidating or not. Yet this rule leaves the court to deter-
mine by the degree of annoyance whether the picketing should be en-
joined or not, and this not completely satisfactory as it forms no
rigid rule or guide.
Intimidation can best be understood by making reference to a few
instances of acts which courts have agreed upon as tending to in-
timidate and thus enjoin. In Goldberg B. & Co. v. Stablemen's
Union 36 the court enjoined a union and its members from picketing
in front or in the immediate vicinity of the business place where pickets
had carried posters bearing the words, "Unfair firm; reduced wages of
employee 50 cents per day. Please don't patronize." The court
said the act tended to intimidate customers and other employees.
A lthough most courts take the view that picketing and the station-
ing of men may be peaceful 37 for the purpose of "patrolling" or "per-
suading," yet these courts concede that when the number of the patrol
is too great the picket becomes per se intimidating and should be
restrained by injunction. The number picketing cannot be so large
as to overawe men seeking employment or going to work.3 8 Under
the Clayton Act, Federal courts will not grant an injunction to prevent
v. Tarrant, 102 Ill. App. 124 (1902) (Here pickets were restrained from calling
employees "scabs" and other abusive names.); Levy v. Rosenstein, op. cit. Supra
note 22; George J. Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 77 N. J. Eq.
219 (1910); Jordahl v. Hayda, 82 Pac. 1079 (1902); Atchinson T. & S. F. R. Co.
v. Gee., 139 Fed. 582 (1905).
34 Pope Motor Car. Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (1906) (The injunction
went only to those acting unlawfully.); Badger Brass Mfg. Co. v. Daly, 137
Wis. 601, 119 N. W. 328 (1909); Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass.
269, 126 N. E. 479 (1920); N. Y. Central Iron Works v. Brennan, 105 N. Y. S.
865 (1907); O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 38 L. R. A. 382 (1897).
35 Op. cit. supra note 25.
36 Op. cit. supra note 30.
37 Amer. Eng. Co. v. International Moulders' Union, 25 Pa. Dist. 564 (Held,
it was permissible to maintain a reasonable number of pickets.) ; Amer. Steel Fdy.
v. Tri-City C. Trades Council, 257 U. S. 185 (1921) (Strikers were limited to one
representative at each point of ingress and egress at the picketed premises, and
all others were enjoined from congregating in the neighborhood street.); Iron
Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., op. cit. supra note 22 (Picketing of small
number should not be enjoined.).
38 Standard Tube & Forkside Co. v. International Union, op. cit. supra note
30; Everett-Waddig Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 53 S. E. 273 (1906);
Niles-Bement Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, etc., op. cit. supra note 25
(A large number of pickets terrorizes and thus is unlawful.); Keuffel v.
Inter. Assoc. of Mach., op. cit. supra note 22 (Picketing in numbers of 25 to
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peaceful picketing. However, this Act does not give a right to assemble
or picket in such numbers as to become a menace and produce in-
timidation by the very fact of the number.3 9
Where -the strike has become a dead issue further picketing is
classed as a nuisance and can be enjoined. 40 Picketing will be en-
joined though peaceful when it is conducted in furtherance of an un-
lawful strike.41 In Philip Henrici Co. v. Alexander 42 where in fact
there was no strike and pickets made statements that there was one,
the court declared the act unlawful and enjoined the pickets.
Generally speaking picketing, for the purpose of inducing a breach
of contract 43 or to induce customers not to patronize certain em-
ployers 44 is enjoined. In Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney 45 an injunc-
tion was granted where members of a union picketed so as to cause
disturbances at their former employer's place, harrassing and an-
noying customers and employees.
In its very nature blocking of an entrance to a business place or
picketed premise is unlawful. It is embarrassing to. whoever wishes
to enter and annoying to the degree it will discourage him to do so.
Besides constituting a public nuisance, this conduct is a nuisance to
the one on the premises and can be enjoined by him. 46
To summarize the view in the cases it may be said the lawfulness
or unlawfulness of picketing is to be governed according to the 'partic-
ular circumstances of each case. If the picketing becomes a weapon
to wield beyond peaceful persuasion and destroy the right of those
entitled to be employed or seek employment it is illegal. The boundary
between lawful and unlawful conduct in the attempt to induce per-
sons, not under contract, to leave the employment of one whose prem-
ises are picketed, or not to enter such employment is the line between
S0 may constitute intimidation although no acts of violence were committed.);
Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union No. 220, 159 Fed. 500
(1908) (Pickets in numbers of 30 to 100 held to constitute intimidation.).
39 Kinlock Tel. Co. v. Local Union No. 2, 265 Fed. 312 (1920).
40 Dail-Overland Co. v. Willy's Overland Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (1920) (When
a plant is operating at full capacity, further acts of picketing are unlawful.).
41 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E. 86
(1921); Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 170,
282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95 (1920).
42 198 Ill. App. 568, 83 N. E. 940 (1916).
43 Rice, etc., Mach., etc., Co. v. Willard, 136 N. E. 629 (Mass. 1922) ; Parker
Paint etc. Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 105 S. E. 911 (1921).
44 Goldberg B. & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, op. cit. supra note 30; Jersey
City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, op. cit. supra note 5.
45 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920); Levy v. Rosensteein, op. cit. supra
note 22.
46 Standard Tube & Forkside Co. v. International Union, op. cit. supra
note 30.
